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POLITICS, PATRONAGE AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Robert M. O'Neil*
William Perry had been a custodian in the Illinois State Building in
Springfield for nearly six years. His performance had been entirely satis-
factory. The day after a Republican governor assumed office, Perry was told
by his supervisor that "if I joined the Republic [sic] Party I would be
able to keep my job." Perry, a registered Democrat, refused to change
his political affiliation. A month later he was terminated by his superior.
"They gave me," he said later, "no reason why I was being let out."1
About the same time, a number of other Illinois state employees, all of
whom happened to be Democrats, were dismissed or terminated on mani-
festly political grounds.
As recently as four or five years ago, such practices would simply have
been viewed as part of the normal operation of the political process. The
few victims of the spoils system who ever found their way to court were
sent away empty handed. They were told that unless they Were protected
by statutory civil service systems they had no legal recourse.2 After the
Illinois purge, however, a group of former state employees brought suit
against the Secretary of State, alleging that patronage dismissal infringed
their first amendment freedoms. Although the district court rejected the
claim in traditional fashion, the court of appeals reversed and announced
a novel precept: that non-policymaking public employees could not be
dismissed solely for refusing to change their party allegiance.3  Two years
* Professor of Law and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs, University
of Cincinnati; Professor of Law and Vice President-Bloomington, Indiana University.
A.B., 1956, A.M., 1957, L.L.B., 1961, Harvard University.
1. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 565 n.4
(7th Cir. 1972).
2. E.g., Norton v. Blaylock, 285 F. Supp. 659, 662-63 (W.D. Ark. 1968); American
Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 535, 280 A.2d
375, 378 (1971). See generally Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils System-
The Judiciary Visits Patronage Place, 57 IowA L. REV. 1320 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils Sytem].
3. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1972). This decision was in substantial conflict with an earlier decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972), which had refused to find a constitutional claim
under similar circumstances. The Second Circuit simply followed the traditional view
of patronage dismissals. (The Second Circuit has recently modified its view on this
issue in Calo v. Paine, 521 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975)). See also Note, Political Patronage
and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Last Hurrah for the Party Faithful?, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 720 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Political Patronage and Unconstitutional
Conditions].
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later, the Seventh Circuit applied the same constitutional precept to a case
involving the political dismissal of employees of the Cook County Sheriff's
office. 4 This time Supreme Court review was sought, and the case will be
argued during the 1975-76 Term.5 The constitutional and public policy
implications of this and other related cases provide the focus of the present
article. Since the legal controversy over patronage dismissal has important
practical and policy dimensions, we begin with some contextual considera-
tions.
I. THE LARGER CONTEXT: POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
The patronage dismissal issue does not arise in a vacuum, but is very much
a part of the general fabric of American political life. There is, first, a
historic dimension of some importance. Patronage and the spoils system
are as old as American government. Thomas Jefferson once asked: "If a
due participation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to be
obtained? Those by death are few; by resignation, none. Can any other
mode than that of removal be proposed?" 6 Resort to the spoils system
in the nineteenth century was bipartisan, as the extensive political purges
by both Jackson and Lincoln attest. In time, the excesses of patronage
and political cynicism led to the reforms of the Pendleton Act, 7 and later
the Hatch Act,8 the first creating a federal civil service system and the
latter curtailing sharply the political activity of most federal employees.0
The restrictions later were extended to many state and local government
employees.10 Meanwhile, state and municipal civil service reforms paral-
leled those of the federal system and increasingly covered the public sector.
(Precise figures are difficult to obtain, but it appears that roughly half of
today's government employees are covered by civil service. Coverage is
more extensive at the federal and municipal levels, less so at the state and
county levels.) 11
As civil service protection expanded, it carried the clear negative implica-
tion that unclassified public workers enjoyed no comparable protection and
4. Bums v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975).
5. Certiorari was granted on October 7, 1975. 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975).
6. S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518 (1943).
7. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403.
8. 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), 54 Stat. 767 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970).
9. See generally Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 510
(1962); Shartsis, The Federal Hatch Act and Related State Court Trends-A Time for
Change?, 25 Bus. LAWYER 1381 (1970); Comment, Freedom of Political Activity for
Civil Servants: An Alternative to Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 41 CEO. WASH. L.
REV. 626 (1973).
10. See Minge, Federal Restrictions on the Political Activities of State and Local
Employees, 57 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1973).
11. See Comment, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political Justifi-
cations, 41 U. Ci. L. REV. 297, 322 & n.113 (1974) [hereinafter cited at Patronage
Dismissals].
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could be dismissed at will when parties changed. Even at the federal level,
where the number of vulnerable positions is relatively small, it generally
has been assumed that a new President eventually will replace all but a
handful of policymaking personnel of the opposite party. At lower levels
of government, where the opportunities are far broader, wholesale purges
following the inauguration of a new party are expected, even though they
are by no means universal.1 2 Until very recently, such dismissals simply
have been accepted by government employees as one of the vicissitudes of
public life.
One reason for the recent changes in attitude and expectation has been
the steady growth of public employment as a component of the total na-
tional work force. Government service accounted for a small fraction of
all jobs even as late as World War II. Today there are roughly 14 million
persons in public positions, comprising some 19 percent of all employed per-
sons. 13 This share has grown steadily, both during times of war and of peace.
Even more important than this general growth trend has been the increas-
ing dominance of the public sector in many occupations. School teachers,
for example, have almost no private sector alternatives. The same is in-.
creasingly true for nurses, librarians, safety personnel, and some types of
scientists and engineers. As enrollment in public institutions of higher
education grows at the expense of once dominant private colleges and
universities, prospective professors also face a narrower range of options
outside the public sector. Thus it will no longer do to say, as courts could
say in an earlier and more mixed economy, that the public employee has
made a voluntary choice by which he is reasonably bound.14 The simple
fact is that jobs in many fields now exist only in the public sector.
Another factor bearing on the patronage dismissal issue is the current
effort to dilute the purity of the civil service system itself. Although the
Hatch Act's restrictions have been sustained twice by the Supreme Court,15
opponents of forced political neutrality in the public service have sought
other forums. Almost unnoticed as a part of the post-Watergate campaign
reform law, Congress freed state and local employees of virtually all the
federal constraints on political activity which previously had bound them.1"
Today, little is forbidden-at least by federal law-except actual candidacy
in partisan elections and pressuring fellow employees for political contribu-
12. Political Patronage and Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 3, at 720.
13. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
265, 351 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) for the earlier
view of the "options" available to the prospective public employee. For general com-
ment, see R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY 49-51 (1970).
15. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
16. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, § 401(a), 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 1502(a)(3) (Sup. 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3) (1970).
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tions. Meanwhile, an even more massive attack on the Hatch Act is under-
way in Congress. Legislation which would remove many of the current
fetters on political activity by federal employees has been passed by the
House of Representatives with strong support from organized labor.17 Should
it pass the Senate, which seems quite likely, it probably will be subject to
presidential veto, with the eventual outcome depending upon the level of
support for an override. On the state level, restrictions on political activity
recently have been diluted, also in response to public employee union
pressure. At the municipal level, similar changes are underway. The Chi-
cago Civil Service Commission has been abolished and its powers trans-
ferred to a city personnel department, a move which some observers fear
may strengthen the patronage powers of the Daley machine.1 8 New York
State, meanwhile, has greatly relaxed the political restrictions on police
officers, 19 so that (to borrow from Justice Holmes' oft-quoted dilemma)
one may now have rights both to talk politics and to be a policeman. 20
These trends are pertinent to the subject under discussion, because legis-
lative bodies seem inclined to put classified civil service workers back into
politics at the same time the courts are beginning to take unclassified public
personnel out of politics.
Third and finally, there is a rising tide of discontent with civil service
systems. Such criticism reflects in major part the growing fiscal plight of
New York and many other governmental units. Whatever may be the
cause of the current condition, civil service and tenure protections have
provided a convenient scapegoat because they seem to deny the flexibility
that is vitally needed in periods of retrenchment. Many harried public
officials doubtless share the view of the Governor of Colorado that civil
service is the enemy of fiscal responsibility: "You've got to be flexible
enough to fire incompetents," he recently stated to a legislative committee,
"and you don't have that in state government." 21 To the extent that the
courts develop safeguards for the historically vulnerable side of the public
work force, they will thus be running against the tide of executive as well
as legislative concern. Obviously, this is not an argument against the ex-
tension of constitutional protection to areas not covered by statutory safe-
guards. Indeed, the pressures from other quarters to weaken or undermine
civil service protection and political neutrality may make the new judicial
17. H.R. 3000, 94th Cong., 1 Sess., known as the Federal Employees' Political Activi-
ties Act of 1975. For the views of the sponsor, see Rep. William L. Clay's letter to the
editor, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1975, at 28, cols. 3-4.
18. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1975, at 12, cols.3-6. In fairness, it should be noted that
this revision reflects recent recommendations of the National Civil Service League, and
that a former executive director of the League advised on the drafting of the new
measure.
19. Id., May 16, 1975, at 20, cols. 1-2.
20. The reference is to McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892).
21. Quoted in Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 20, 1975, p. 5, cols. 1-2.
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concern even more appropriate and timely. Clearly, the Supreme Court
should not, as Mister Dooley charged it was doing at the turn of the
century, "follow th' iliction returns." Yet it is important for those who
analyze the patronage dismissal issue as a constitutional problem to under-
stand pertinent trends in other forums.
II. PATRONAGE DISMISSALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES
We now return to the case of William Perry, the Illinois custodian dis-
missed for refusing to switch his partisan allegiance. A court might dis-
pose of such a case in three possible ways. First, the suit could be dis-
missed along the traditional lines, the court holding that public employees
enjoyed only such safeguards as the civil service laws conferred upon
them. 22 At the other extreme, a court could find that all such dismissals
were per se unconstitutional on any of several grounds to which we shall
shortly turn our attention. 23 The third alternative is the one the court of
appeals actually adopted in the Illinois case-to draw lines within the
public service, holding that certain groups of unclassified personnel could
be ousted on political grounds while others enjoyed constitutional protec-
tion from patronage dismissal because of the nature and level of their
positions. 24 This third view seeks to balance important competing interests.
Not all patronage dismissals come about in the same way. Probably
the most common practice is the one described in the Perry case--a su-
perior administrator tells the employee that he or she would be well ad-
vised to switch party affiliation (or must do so), with the strong implica-
tion that failure to take the hint will result in termination. (When the
coup is eventually administered, there may be no specific reference to
politics, but the employee will have little doubt of the basis of the action
if his or her previous record was satisfactory.) There are, however, alterna-
tive methods. In Burns v. Elrod,21 the case now before the Supreme Court,
employees of the Cook County Sheriff's office were terminated for ostensi-
bly political reasons when a Democratic Sheriff took over-some because
they were already members of the wrong party, others because they lacked
the requisite political sponsorship from the Democratic organization, and
still others because they refused to pledge their political allegiance, to
make contributions or to work for the Democratic Party. Presumably, the
22. E.g., Norton v. Blaylock, 285 F. Supp. 659, 662-63 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
23. This is essentially the view suggested in Patronage Dismissals, supra note 11, at
298-306.
24. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1974); cf. Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), in which another federal
court of appeals seems willing to adopt such a standard, but finds the particular plaintiff
unable to claim relief under it.
25. 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975).
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manner in which the pressure is applied, or the basis on which the dismissal
ultimately rests, should be relevant to the disposition of individual cases.
With these considerations in mind, we turn to an analysis of the relevant
constitutional issues.
A. First Amendment Freedoms of Expression and Association
The most obvious constitutional basis for a challenge to patronage dis-
missal is the first amendment. Clearly the loss of a job based on party
affiliation significantly impairs a public employee's political freedom.26
While such a dismissal may not actually prevent the person from voting
according to individual choice and conscience, the inhibition of political
liberty is pervasive. In analogous contexts the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that deterrence to the exercise of individual rights and liberties
need not be complete in order to be unconstitutional. 27  Nor is there any
question that political activity is generally within the scope of first amend-
ment freedoms, even though not expressly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.2 8
Several lines of cases suggest how the general principle might be made
applicable to the particular issue at hand.
First, and most clearly in point, are cases involving restrictions on
political association and affiliation. In a series of decisions striking down
loyalty oaths and disclaimers, the Supreme Court has held that a person
may not be compelled, as a condition of public employment, to forswear
anything less than knowing, active membership in an unlawful organiza-
tion (e.g., the Communist Party) with the specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of that organization. 29  Persons who have a lesser degree
of affinity or who do not share the group's illegal aims, the Court has
said, simply do not pose that degree of danger which will warrant taking
away their first amendment political freedoms.30 By simplistic analogy,
it would appear that mere members of the Republican or the Democratic
party, a fortiori, would pose no serious threat to the functioning of govern-
ment and thus should be allowed to keep both their party ties and their
jobs.
There are, however, several distinctions. Dismissal because of mem-
bership in a "subversive" organization clearly creates a stigma-so serious
that one who is thus branded may be effectively blacklisted from private
26. See Patronage Dismissals, supra note 11, at 305.
27. Eg., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.,
513 (1958). See generally O'Neil, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Condition of Un-
constitutional Conditions, 4 RUTGERS-CAMIDEN L.J. 58 (1972).
28. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
29. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
30. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
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as well as public employment. 31 Dismissal because one is not a member of
the major party in power hardly imputes such infamy or carries such con-
sequences. Moreover, the governmental interest behind anti-Communist
oaths is the chimerical prospect of violent overthrow or internal subversion
of the government; the interests reflected in patronage dismissals are the
more practical and immediate desires for loyalty, responsibility, efficiency
and party vitality. (This is not to say that such desires or needs do in
fact justify dismissal on political grounds, but simply that the asserted
interests are more tangible and cognizable in the one case than in the
other.) Then, too, patronage dismissals are as ancient as the Republic itself,
and are part of the fabric of our national political life, while loyalty oaths are
of rather recent (and highly suspect) origin.
Apart from these differences, it is highly relevant that the Supreme
Court has twice recently sustained restrictions on the political freedom
of public employees. 32  In both cases, the 'Court held that the strong
interest in keeping the federal service free of politics justified even
rather drastic curtailment of public workers' first amendment rights. To
be sure, the underlying interests recognized in those cases are diametrically
opposed to the interests buttressing the patronage system-the former
aim to keep politics out of government and the latter to keep it in-but
the basic analysis of first amendment rights is analogous. These cir-
cumstances at least suggest that the constitutional issue is not as simple
or as obvious as resort to the loyalty oath cases initially might suggest.
Meanwhile, lower courts have been more imaginative than the Supreme
Court in addressing restrictions on political activity of public employees.
The California Supreme Court nearly ten years ago formulated a grid
for the constitutional analysis of such restrictions. Conditions attached
to public positions must, held the California court, meet three essential
conditions: They must "rationally relate to the enhancement of the public
service"; the "benefits which the public gains by the restraints [must]
outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights"; and govern-
ment must demonstrate that "no alternatives less subversive of constitu-
tional rights are available." 33 Several California restrictions on political
activity of public employees failed to meet these tests and were held
unconstitutional-though the court acknowledged the legitimacy of the
underlying governmental interests and suggested that narrower, more
precise means of implementation would fare better in the future.3 4  The
31. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Edgerton, J.,
dissenting).
32. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
33. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d
409, 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1966).
34. E.g., Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 409 (1967).
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application of such a discriminating grid to restrictions on the political
freedoms of public employees underscores the inappropriateness of a
simplistic approach to the patronage dismissal.
A further source of first amendment precedent is the line of recent cases
involving party affiliation and the franchise. In Williams v. Rhodes,35 the
Supreme Court struck down Ohio's differential qualification tests for
minor and major political parties, holding that such a scheme denied
equal protection to voters and failed to show the "compelling interest"
which would warrant a heavy burden on the voter's right to choose
minor party candidates. Several years later, in Kusper v. Pontikes,36 the
Court invalidated a more subtle limit on political choice-an Illinois law
which barred a voter from crossing party lines for almost two years after vot-
ing in a primary election. The Court concluded that the law "substantially
restricts an Illinois voter's freedom to change his political party affilia-
tion" and stressed the constitutional stature of the voter's "ability to
associate effectively with the party of her choice." 31
Superficially, one could argue from these two cases that patronage dis-
missals fall under a comparable ban because they similarly inhibit party
choice and political affiliation. But the analogy is imperfect, .and the
analysis must be more complex. For one thing, the Williams and Pontikes
cases both involved the direct exercise of the franchise, which clearly
enjoys the highest status in the array of first amendment political freedoms.
The public employee who is told he must join or contribute to the opposite
party to retain his job is not required to change his voting pattern as
well. Moreover, even in the voting cases the Supreme Court recognized
that a "compelling state interest" might justify severe curtailment of party
affiliation, but found the particular interests asserted by Ohio and Illinois
constitutionally inadequate.38 Additional and very recent evidence of
the non-absolute character of such individual rights comes from the cur-
rent litigation involving the constitutionality of the 1974 Federal Election
Law Amendments. In Buckley v. Valeo,3 9 the court of appeals held
that strong governmental interests, such as those reflected in the post-
Watergate campaign reform legislation, may justify certain inhibitions
on political choice:
To the extent that prohibitions and restraints-imposed by the Act in
service of the compelling governmental interest in insuring the integrity of
federal elections against undue influence-work incidental restrictions on
35. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
36. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
37. Id. at 57-58.
38. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
39. 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S.
Jan. 30, 1976).
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First Amendment freedoms, these constraints, broadly considered, are nec-
essary to assure the integrity of federal elections.
40
Granting that the interests asserted in support of the campaign law reforms
may stand higher than those reflected in patronage dismissals, the point
remains that Williams and Pontikes do not invalidate automatically all re-
strictions on political affiliation and choice.
B. Substantive Due Process
A second constitutional basis for challenging all patronage dismissals is
the recently revived concept of substantive due process. The current source
of such protectiopn is the 1974 Supreme Court decision in Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur.41 With only two dissents, the Court held that the
mandatory maternity leave requirements of many public school districts
were arbitrary and thus invalid on general due process grounds--not (as
most observers expected) on equal protection principles. Specifically, the
Court found that the uniform cut-off dates bore "no rational relationship to
the valid State interest" in maintaining continuity of instruction or in keep-
ing physically unfit teachers out of the classroom.
42
The possible relevance of LaFleur to patronage dismissals has not yet been
tested. It would seem, however, that rules terminating employment because
of party affiliation should be viewed with at least as strict scrutiny as those
triggered by pregnancy.43 However valid and substantial may be the as-
serted governmental interests, LaFleur seems to require proof of a rational
relationship between those goals and the dismissal of a particular employee.
The resulting burden would be quite similar to the California Supreme
Court's mandate that restrictions which curtail first amendment freedoms
be shown to "rationally relate to the enhancement of the public service" and
that less restrictive alternatives be unavailable. 44
C. Ecual Protection
Closely related is the suggestion that patronage dismissals may deny equal
protection to their victims. 45 At least two specific distinctions appear vulner-
able. One is the different treatment of similar groups of public employees
on the basis of party membership, affiliation, or support-a classification
40. Id. at 842.
41. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
42. Id. at 643.
43. The Court in LaFleur did classify the bearing of children and decisions con-
cerning procreation as "protected freedoms," citing, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). This interest surely does not, however, enjoy a greater degree of constitutional
protection than the first amendment right to participate in civic life and expression.
44. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d
409, 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1966).
45. See, e.g., Patronage Dismissals, supra note 11, at 305-06.
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that would appear constitutionally suspect (like geography and wealth).
Strong support for this view comes from Williams v. Rhodes, 46 which
ultimately turned on equal protection rather than the first amendment,
though citing both constitutional grounds for the voter's right to prefer minor
parties.
The other possibly vulnerable classification is the one drawn between
protected (i.e., civil service) and unprotected groups of public employees.
As a result of what may have been the accident of legislative draftsmanship,
persons in one category are immune to the political sword, while others are
fully exposed, even though their tasks may be quite similar.
The likelihood of success on either equal protection ground would de-
pend largely on the categorization of the underlying individual interest. If
that interest were deemed "fundamental," then the courts would subject the
classification to strict scrutiny and would sustain it only upon finding a
compelling governmental interest.47 The Williams and Pontikes cases sug-
gest a basis for the "fundamental interest" and "strict scrutiny" test, although
(as we have already observed) those cases both dealt with actual voting and
not with other forms of political activity and affiliation. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's insensitivity to a similar argument in the Hatch Act cases 4s
-that the distinction between classified and unclassified personnel related
irrationally and arbitrarily to the need for political naturalization-leaves
one less optimistic about the equal protection clause as a basis of constitu-
tional attack on patronage dismissals.
D. Procedural Due Process.
A fourth and final basis of attack on patronage dismissals is the absence
of any sort of hearing. Now that the Supreme Court has declined to extend
to public employment the requirement of a pretermination hearing, 49 the
status of this argument is uncertain. Where a particular administrative
action imposes a stigma, or where an employee's expectation creates a
property interest in the position, or where the termination is based on the
exercise of a constitutional right, then a hearing is required.50 These general
precepts, however, do not afford much solace to the typical victim of patron-
age dismissal. As we noted earlier, a political dismissal imposes no badge
of infamy, and seldom hurts the person's prospects for future employment.
Moreover, the very fact that exempt employees are subject to patronage
46. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
47. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969).
48. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
49. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
50. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
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dismissals at all tends to defeat any possible proprietary claim of the kind
that arises from tenure and other forms of job security or expectation. Only
the third option remains-the claim that the dismissal reflects the exercise of
an independent constitutional right such as freedom of expression. 51 This
is, of course, the very issue we explored under the first constitutional head-
ing. If a sound first amendment claim can be established in patronage
cases, then we really do not need a procedural right; if it cannot be estab-
lished, the basis for a hearing in the typical patronage case seems doubtful
under the current Supreme Court view of due process for public employees.
Thus it appears that the likeliest grounds on which to challenge patronage
dismissals are the first amendment and the substantive due process concepts.
Under either constitutional heading, the government agency responsible
for the dismissal would be required to prove at least (a) a substantial
governmental interest, (b) a rational relationship between that interest and
such dismissal, and (c) the unavailability of alternatives which would restrict
less severely individual freedoms. In light of this framework, it becomes
important to examine both the asserted governmental interests and the
relationship between those interests and the patronage dismissal.
III. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS AND PATRONAGE DIsMIssALS
At least three types of governmental interests have been cited by com-
mentators and critics. First, it has been suggested that the patronage sys-
tem ensures the efficient operation of government. 52 Specifically, it has been
argued that loyalty in government service is maximized through patronage
and that responsibility and responsiveness to policymaking superiors are
enhanced by this approach to appointments and retention. Second, it has
been argued that patronage strengthens and maintains a healthy and effec-
tive two-party system, since the expectation of the "spoils" at the end of a
successful campaign provides a vital incentive or stimulus to political activi-
ty.5 3 Third, it has been suggested more broadly that the efficient operation
of government demands that the philosophy of a new administration be re-
flected throughout the public service.5 4 Should the patronage system now
be held unconstitutional, government arguably would cease to serve these
interests and the political process as we know it would atrophy.
This is not the place to appraise the validity of each of these asserted
interests. That has been done elsewhere, and requires more the expertise
of political science than of law.55 In order to advance the constitutional
analysis, we may assume that each of these objectives is in the abstract a
valid governmental interest. The critical question is that of the relationship
51. 408 U.S. at 596.
52. A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils System, supra note 2, at 1324-25.
53. Id. at 1325-26.
54. Patronage Dismissals, supra note 11, at 319-21.
55. Id. at 317-28.
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between the end and the means: whether the patronage dismissal or affilia-
tion requirement is rationally and directly related to the asserted interest and
whether that interest could be served by less restrictive means.
IV. SERVING THE INTERES-IS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
ANALYSIS OF PATRONAGE DiSMISSALS
Clearly, any valid constitutional test must accommodate the easy cases at
both extremes. However persuasive may be the constitutional attack, it
seems quite clear that some dismissals on partisan grounds are valid and
necessary. At the other extreme, some dismissals bear little or no relation-
ship to the asserted governmental interests and thus would seem invalid on
substantive due process grounds without even reaching the first amendment
issues. What is needed is a framework that will both accomodate the
various relevant principles and issues and help courts to decide the difficult
intermediate cases.
A. Nature of the Position
Every court that has considered the patronage issue seriously has recog-
nized obvious differences between the governor's executive secretary and the
state capitol custodian. There appears to be general agreement that the for-
mer position should be under political control, but that no such justification
exists for the ouster of a custodian of the opposite party. The line between
these two cases has been drawn in terms of whether or not the employee
holds a "policymaking" position. On the basis of this distinction, the Seventh
Circuit held unconstitutional the dismissal of custodians and other sub-policy
level employees, 56 but sustained the dismissal of employees of the Indiana
State Department of Public Instruction who "were clearly engaged in the
implementation of the policies of the [Department] and at least indirectly
in the formulation of those policies." 51 The case currently before the Su-
preme Court is closer to the middle of this continuum; the court of appeals
had sent back to the district court the factual issue of whether the Cook
County Deputy Sheriffs were policymaking employees. 58 In an earlier case
in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court divided 4-3 over the constitution-
ality of patronage dismissals,9 the dissenters argued that a governor should
be able to dismiss solely on partisan grounds "any employee who is engaged
in a policymaking position, or in a position charged with implementing or
56. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1972).
57. Indiana State Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir.
1974).
58. Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975).
59. American Fed'n of State, County and Mtinicipal Employees v. Shapp, 433 Pa.
527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
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devising the means of implementing the governor's policies." (The applica-
tion of that test would have been easy in the particular case since the plain-
tiffs were "unskilled and semi-skilled employees whose daily occupations are
merely to maintain the public highways.") 60
Clearly the policymaking test is not self-defining. There is, however, one
analogous context from which one might borrow a working definition. In
Barr v. Matteo,61 the Supreme Court held that certain federal officials enjoyed
absolute immunity from defamation suits for statements made in an official
capacity. The protected group included those "policymaking executive offi-
cials" at the cabinet and sub-cabinet level who, in the Court's view, should
be free from the fear of damage suits to ensure the smooth and responsible
operation of government.6 2 The rationale for immunizing certain highly
responsible and sensitive positions from defamation liability is at least
partially akin to the rationale for leaving such positions under the patronage
system. Below that level, the acknowledged interests in the smooth and
efficient operation of government seem to warrant neither the extension of
the spoils system nor the extension of an absolute privilege to defame.
An alternative but much lower level at which the line might be drawn is
suggested by the cases defining the privilege to make defamatory statements
about public officials. Since that privilege first was recognized, in 1964,63
the Supreme Court scrupulously has avoided drawing a clear, sharp line
marking its lower boundary. Well within the privilege are such positions
as state university football coach,64 candidate for sheriff,6 5 and deputy chief
of detectives of a city police department.6 6 Given the policies behind this
constitutional privilege and its rather broad scope, this line would seem a
dangerously low one in the patronage dismissal context; many people who
might be deemed "public officials" for defamation purposes should not be
subject to political dismissal.
If the line is drawn roughly in accord with Barr v. Matteo, then the essen-
tial governmental interests would appear to be adequately met. Persons
above that line are clearly involved in the formulation and implementation
of policy. The chief executive or administrator should be able to insist both
on loyalty and partisan affiliation from such people. The continued presence
of politically dissonant or disloyal persons in such positions-however com-
petent they may be-could seriously cripple the effectuation of a new ad-
ministration's policies and programs. The opportunity to appoint key people
at that level constitutes a major incentive or inducement for seekers of high
60. Id. at 543, 280 A.2d at 382.
61. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
62. Id. at 571; see Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits
Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1960).
63. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
64. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
65. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
66. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
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elective office; the prospect of having such positions "locked in" after election
would discourage many aspirants and would rigidify the quality of political
life.6 7 Even the Seventh Circuit, the court least sympathetic to patronage
dismissals, has recognized that "considerations of personal loyalty or other
factors besides determination of policy, may justify the employment of
political associates in certain positions." 68 For all these reasons, it would
seem reasonable to draw the line just below the policymaking level and to
locate that line with the help of the Supreme Court's decision in Barr v.
Matteo.
B. Form of the Political Condition
The validity of a patronage dismissal may also depend in part on the way
in which the restriction or condition is imposed. It would be one thing to
warn an employee not to criticize openly the new party and then to dismiss
him because he failed to heed the caution. It would be quite another matter
to force a public employee, even at a policymaking level, to profess support
publicly for an abhorrent political view or organization.69  Between these
two extremes lies the general run of cases, in which a person is dismissed
either for having belonged to the "wrong" party in the past or for refusing
to switch allegiance after the new party takes over. In such cases the form
of the condition probably adds relatively little, though it may be helpful
where the position is very close to the line separating policymaking and non-
policymaking roles.
A similar and possibly relevant factor should be the scope of the dis-
missals. At least as a practical matter, the extent of the displacement ac-
companying a change in party would affect the likelihood of proving that a
particular dismissal was politically motivated. If only a small number of
jobs change and nothing is said specifically about party affiliation or support,
it may be extremely difficult to convince a court of what the press and others
suspect about the underlying motivation. If the displacement reaches purge
proportions, however, and if concurrent public statements generate a clear
inference of partisan motivation, then the case obviously becomes much
easier to establish. 70 . Apart from these practical problems of proof, there is
some appeal to a "de minimis" rule which would allow a moderate degree
of patronage displacement when a new party assumes office, even if that
displacement reaches below the policymaking level. Whether or not such a
67. See Note, 57 IowA L. REv. 1320, 1345 (1972).
68. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th
Cir. 1972). As this qualification suggests, the policymaking line is not capable of
precise location on the spectrum of public officialdom. For critical comments on the
definitional problem, see Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir. 1974);
Note, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1090, 1097-98 (1973).
69. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
70. See Patronage Dismissals, supra note 11, at 327-28.
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suggestion rises to the dignity of constitutional law, it surely does have
some practical appeal in an eminently practical setting.
C. Clarity of Notice and Source of the Position
The way in which the person subject to dismissal obtained the position is
sometimes thought relevant. If, for example, the position has traditionally
been a "patronage job," and the incumbent obtained it on openly political
grounds, some courts will stop there. The majority in the Pennsylvania case
concluded that "State employees who obtained their positions [jobs]-as all
the parties agree they did-by politics or party patronage, and complain of
being fired solely on the grounds of political sponsorship or affiliation, have
S.. no Constitutionally protected right to their jobs .. ." 11 That is, "those
who ... live by the political sword must be prepared to die by the political
sword." 72
Other courts have approached the issue more cautiously. The Seventh
Circuit, while acknowledging that a factual basis for such waiver might be
established in individual cases, has warned of the hazards of presuming a
general waiver from the acceptance of a traditional patronage position.
73
The Supreme Court, moreover, has cautioned repeatedly that a waiver of
constitutional rights will not be inferred lightly.74 Thus there should be
proof in the individual case that the political vulnerability of the position
was well known and understood at the time the plaintiff assumed it. Where
substantial doubt exists about the clarity of this understanding, the "notice"
or "waiver" factor might weigh against the validity of the dismissal, regard-
less of the level of the position.
D. Extent and Nature of the Legislative judgment
The clarity with which the legislature has excluded a particular position
from civil service protection may also be germane. Sometimes the statute
has been written to exempt a particular position with unmistakable clarity
and readily inferable intent; in other cases the legislative classification is so
general as to afford little or no insight. The percentage of the public work
force covered by civil service may also be relevant; where the legislature has
given protection to a major share of the public sector, courts might be more
willing to sustain political dismissals within the unprotected area than would
71. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp, 433 Pa.
527, 535, 280 A.2d 375, 378 (1971) (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378. On the significance of this factor, compare Nun-
nery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974) ("she voluntarily accepted the patronage
position with a full realization of its conditions and its hazards"), with Bond v. County
of Delaware, 368 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiff alleged he began work un-
aware that his position was a "patronage job").
73. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 573-74
(7th Cir. 1972).
74. E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
be the case if only a small fraction of all positions were protected. More-
over, the nature and quality of civil service protection might also be relevant
-the type of hearing provided for dismissal of a civil servant, the specifica-
tion of grounds for dismissal, and other similar factors.
This line of argument could, of course, prove too much. The fact that the
legislature has chosen to protect some public employees from political dis-
missal surely does not preclude judicial protection for others. Since we are
dealing here with a possible constitutional right, the withholding of statutory
coverage is surely not dispositive. Legislative intent may, however, be use-
ful and relevant in resolving close cases, since the line between policy-
making and other positions is far from precise. If the legislature has care-
fully and conscientiously addressed the legal and policy issues implicated in
the patronage litigation, a court might then approach the issue with some-
what greater deference.
V. CONCLUSION
There are no clear, easy answers in the patronage dismissal field. About
all that is certain is that the volume of litigation will continue to increase-
unless, of course, the Supreme Court holds that no constitutional remedy
exists, even for the statehouse janitor. There is a need for guidance in dif-
ferentiating between public employees who should be amenable to changes
in political fortune and those who should not. That guidance probably can
come only through case-by-case determination, since the demarcation of a
precise line by the Supreme Court seems as unlikely here as in the public
official-defamation area. The determination of such guidelines will at least
be aided by consideration of various factors of the kind summarized
briefly in this article. Whatever may happen to the civil service system
at the hands of frustrated executives and impatient legislators, a wholly new
source of protection for the neutrality of public employees seems to be
emerging.
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